000 04533nam a2200781 4500
001 2890
010 _a9780521796798
090 _a2890
100 _a20080109d2002 k y0pory5003 ba
101 0 _aeng
102 _aUS
200 1 _aHeuristics and biases
_ethe psychology of intuitive judgment
_fThomas Gilovich, Dale Griffin, Daniel Kahneman
210 _aNew York
_cCambridge University Press
_d2002
215 _a857 p.
464 1 _tTheory-driven reasoning about plausible pasts and probable futures in World politics
_032949
464 1 _tHeuristics and biases in application
_032950
464 1 _tClinical versis actuarial judgment
_032951
464 1 _tThe calibration of expert judgment : heuristics and biases beyond the laboratory
_032952
464 1 _tDo analysts overreact?
_032953
464 1 _tAssessing uncertainty in physical constants
_032954
464 1 _tUnderstanding misunderstanding : social psychological perspectives
_032955
464 1 _tWhen less is more : counterfactual thinking and satisfaction among olympic medalists
_032956
464 1 _tLike goes with like : the role of representativeness in erroneous and pseudo-scientific beliefs
_032957
464 1 _tThe hothand in basketball : on the misperception of random sequences
_032958
464 1 _tIntuitive politicians, theologians, and presucutors : exploring the empirical implications of deviant functionalist metaphors
_032959
464 1 _tHow good are fast and frugal heuristics?
_032960
464 1 _tFeelings as information : moods influence judgments and processing strategies
_032961
464 1 _tThe use of statistical heuristics in everyday inductive reasoning
_032962
464 1 _tRemarks on support theory : recent advances and future directions
_032963
464 1 _tUnopacking, repaking, and anchoring : advances in support theory
_032964
464 1 _tSupport theory : a nonextensional representation of subjective probability
_032965
464 1 _tIndividual differences in reasoning : implications for the rationality debate?
_032966
464 1 _tThe affect heuristic
_032967
464 1 _tTwo systems of reasoning
_032968
464 1 _tCounterfactual thought, regret, and superstition : how to avoid kicking yourself
_032969
464 1 _tNorm theory : comparing reality of its alternatives
_032970
464 1 _tWhen presictions fail : the dilemma of unrealistic optimism
_032971
464 1 _tAmbiguity and self-evaluation : the role of ideosyncratic trait definitions in self-serving assessments of ability
_032972
464 1 _tResistance of personal risk perceptions to debiasing interventions
_032973
464 1 _tDurability bias in effective forecasting
_032974
464 1 _tRobability judgment across cultures
_032975
464 1 _tInside the planning fallacy : the causes and consequences of optimistic time predictions
_032976
464 1 _tThe weighting of evidence and the determinantes of confidence
_032977
464 1 _tCompatibility effects in judgment and choice
_032978
464 1 _tSympathetic magical thinking : the contagion and similarity heuristics
_032979
464 1 _tMental contamination and the debiasing problem
_032980
464 1 _tInferential correction
_032981
464 1 _tSelf-anchoring in conversation : why language users do not do what they should
_032982
464 1 _tPutting adjustment back in the anchoring and adjustment heuristic
_032983
464 1 _tIncorporating the irrelevant : anchors in judgment of belief and value
_032984
464 1 _tImagining can heighten or lower the perceived likelihood of contracting a sideade : the mediating effect of ease of imagery
_032985
464 1 _tHow alike is it? versus how likely is it? : a disjuntion fallacy is probability judgments
_032986
464 1 _tRepresentativeness revisited : attribute substitution in intuitive judgment
_032987
464 1 _tExtensional versus intuitive reasoning : the conjunction in probability judgment
_032988
464 1 _tIntroduction - heuristics and biases : then and now
_032989
606 1 _aPsicologia Social
606 1 _aJulgamento
606 1 _aRacíocinio
606 1 _aPensamento crítico
606 1 _aPensamento contrafactual
606 1 _aHeuristic
686 _a3000 - Psicologia Social
686 _a3040 - Percepção Social e Cognição Social
702 1 _aGilovich
_bThomas
_ced.
702 1 _aGriffin
_bDale
_ced.
702 1 _aKahneman
_bDaniel
_ced.
856 4 _uhttps://catalogo.ispa.pt/opac/biblioteca/localizacao_doc/s1.htm